WHO WAS THE AUTHOR OF THE GERMAN PLAN FOR THE CAMPAIGN TO THE WEST IN 1940?

The emergence of the German plan for a war campaign in the West in 1940 has elements of drama considering the magnitude of the risks, and if we bear in mind the devastating experiences of the Germans on the same battlefield in the First World War. This paper tries to shed light on Hitler’s role in military preparations and the creation of a plan independently of von Manstein.

Author: Miroslav Goluža

UDK: 355.4(430)“1940“

355.424.5(4-15)“1940“

355.311.3(430)“1940“

Professional work

Received: 29. III. 2019.

Accepted: 1. VII. 2019.

Polemos 22 (2019.) 1-2: 57-72, ISSN 1331-5595

SUMMARY

The development of the war plan within German campaign to the West in 1940 has elements of the military-historical drama, with regard to the size of the risk. The signifi­cance of the German war plan in 1940 is even greater, having in mind German dispiriting experience from World War I, on the same theatre of war.

Military historians have connected its inception with Field Marshal von Manstein. The aim of this paper is not to throw into doubt the fact that von Manstein had proposed to the Army Command the plan he had described in his memoirs, but to shed some light on the role of Hitler as Commander-in-Chief in military preparations and creation of the plan, regardless of von Manstein. People who were in immediate vicinity of Hitler were used as reliable sources in this paper. Through a critical analysis of these sources, it is possible to establish that Hitler was the author of the war plan in German campaign to the West in 1940 and, as Commander-in-Chief, he possessed necessary competencies for such accomplishment. Independently, but at the same time, Manstein developed an identical plan that reached Hitler in an indirect way, not earlier than in February 1940, due to objection of the Army Command. Hence, it is more adequately to talk about Hitler’s war plan. In this case, the Commander-in-Chief managed to enforce his war plan upon the entire Army Command, and Manstein was the only senior officer who supported him.

Key words: Erich von Manstein, Adolf Hitler, Hermann Giesler, Wilhelm Keitel, Alfred von Schlieffen, Fall Gelb, armoured division.

INTRODUCTION

The German war plan of 1914, which was based on the Schlieffen Plan,[1] envisaged a war on two fronts. On the western front, it was necessary to surround and neutralize the bulk of the French forces by encircling the right wing across Belgium, and then turn east towards Russia. The implementation of the plan was maximally strained because the Germans only had a dense and well-organized railway network at their disposal as means of transport. Truck transport was just beginning. The Schlieffen plan, one of the most ambitious in military history, ended in failure and with unprecedented human losses.

Figure 1. German plan for the war campaign to the West in 1914.[2]

After the capitulation of Poland in the fall of 1939, the Germans did not have a single and elaborate plan for the West. There were major differences between the Army High Command[3] and Hitler. The thesis about Manstein’s[4] plan was popularized by Liddell Hart,[5] who talked to captured prominent German commanders who did not mention Hitler’s plans for the west at all. For them, Hitler appears in that role only when the offensive begins. It is not disputed that Manstein repeatedly proposed a plan of attack that ended in a spectacular victory. In his memoirs, Hitler is sidelined or mentioned with the intention of establishing how he accepted Manstein’s idea. Manstein (2007) notes that Hitler probably had a similar idea, but does not go further than that statement. It is interesting that he does not problematize the authorship of the plan, although he mentions that Hitler claimed in a conversation with him that it was also his plan. If Hitler only needed one conversation to accept the idea of carrying out a major attack against the French in the “tank-impassable” Ardennes terrain, instead of repeating the plan from the First World War, then it must have been Hitler’s idea for a long time.

Hitler was not such a military dilettante that he would accept something entirely new after one conversation with Manstein. This is supported by the fact that Hitler did not assign him any role in the planning and implementation of the first phase of the war campaign to the West, but remained the commander of the infantry corps in the background. During his farewell visit in 1944, Manstein could have discussed the details of the creation of this plan with Hitler, but he did not do so.[6] He only mentions that Hitler was pleased to remind him of the fact that they had the same plan in 1940. So that question remained in the air in his memoirs.

It should be emphasized that on January 27, 1940, due to his ideas, Manstein was removed from his position as Chief of Staff of Army Group A[7] and could no longer propose his solutions to the Supreme Command of the Army, nor influence the course of operations in the first phase of the campaign. So, only at Hitler’s direct request, skipping the command of the Army, did he get the chance to present his plan to him. Based on the statements of the German commanders in captivity and Manstein’s memoirs, it was believed that Manstein devised this plan, and later historians out of inertia repeated it. This was easier to accept because Manstein was the most prominent German commander. Although the topic of this work is a first-class challenge for military history, historians have not paid adequate attention to it.[8] The German historian Jacobsen (1957) was the first to notice Hitler’s role in the creation of the plan, with the conclusion that it was the joint work of Hitler and Manstein. And the distinguished American military historian Robert Doughty (2014) notes that at the meeting of the military summit on October 25, 1939, Hitler first proposed a major strike through the Ardennes. Doughty does not mention the opposition between Hitler and the Army High Command, but on the contrary claims that they came to the same solution simultaneously, but separately, and vaguely concludes that the Germans came up with a new plan on February 24, 1940 only when Manstein introduced Hitler to his ideas. An exception to this topic is the British historian David Irving (2002), who, using sources from Hitler’s closest environment, gave a short chronology of events in 1939 and 1940, from which Hitler’s role is visible, but did not engage in a deeper analysis. In this paper, the publications of military officials who had direct contact with Hitler were used, and from which it can be concluded that Hitler not only devised the plan, but is also most responsible for the appropriate military preparations before the war.

REASONS FOR ASSIGNING THE WAR PLAN TO ERICH VON MANSTEIN

The attitude of the high commanders of the Army after the defeat in 1945

Erich von Manstein describes the time after the attack on Poland in 1939 as the sinking of the Supreme Command of the Army. It was difficult for him and many senior commanders that the Supreme Command of the Army lost its importance when creating war plans. Namely, after the Polish campaign, Hitler completely took matters into his own hands through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.[9] After the war, these commanders tried to distance themselves as much as possible from National Socialism and Hitler, and at the same time preserve as much as possible the reputation of the armed forces and emphasize their military merits. In such an environment, the thesis arose that Manstein was the sole author of the plan for the war campaign to the West. Thus, one officer, who does not have direct access to the commander-in-chief, is designated as the creator of victory. Theoretically, this is possible if the commander-in-chief is incompetent or completely leaves the planning and management of operations to the junior commanders.[10] This was not the case in Germany during the Second World War.

In his memoirs, Manstein first claims that Hitler accepted his idea, and then says that he does not know if Hitler was familiar with his plan, although after the war he had enough time to become familiar with the claims of unambiguous Hitler’s authorship.[11] A commander of his level must have known more, especially since he lived long after the events he describes. Since Manstein continued his career as a military adviser to the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer after the war, one can conclude that his avoidance of this topic stems from political opportunism.

The image of Hitler created in the media by the victors

When it comes to Hitler’s military competence, historical facts must be separated from the image created about him by the victorious propaganda during and after the Second World War – the image of a hysterical man who rose to the rank of corporal in the First World War, and as a civilian remained a frustrated artist or fellow painter. If things are put this way, it is logical to accept the thesis that the war plan was designed by Manstein, the chief of staff army group A. To understand Hitler’s military capabilities, it is convenient to recall an episode from the time when he was fighting for power as a politician and had an economic adviser in the party who was supposed to propose solutions for getting out of the economic crisis. Because he did not understand the economy and monetary policy, Hitler often made digressions about military history in conversation. In order to support his favorite thesis about the crucial importance of imagination or intuition in decision-making, he once mentioned in a conversation that Alexander the Great in the battle of Isa in 333 BC. n. e. dealt a decisive blow to the opponent’s center instead of looking for a solution on the wings (Wagener 1985). He confidently claimed that Alexander did not learn at school what he would do as a military leader, but that it was the result of a momentary inspiration.

Many people from Hitler’s environment mentioned that he was a passionate reader (Ryback 2009). This is evidenced by his three libraries as well as the records of books he borrowed from libraries in Linz and Vienna. From the verbal duels with the commanders of the army, as well as on other occasions, it can be clearly seen that Hitler did not need lessons from military and political history. Although self-taught, he constantly surprised his interlocutors with his knowledge of military history. Even Hitler’s post-war harsh critic, head of the press office Otto Dietrich (2010), emphasized his broad knowledge of military issues, memory and willpower. General Hasso von Manteuffel said of Hitler that he had solid war experience from the First World War, and that he was well versed in military issues and the tactical capabilities of units down to the division level (Liddell Hart 2002). General Hermann Balck[12] (2015) emphasized Hitler’s exceptional understanding of operational issues. In assessing Hitler’s military capabilities, Liddell Hart went the furthest, who in his concluding assessment of German military commanders in World War II claims that Hitler had “characteristic qualities of a genius, but also a tendency to make elementary mistakes both in planning and in implementation” (Liddell Hart 2002:299).

The image that propaganda creates of a defeated opponent may make some sense for political purposes, but from the point of view of military history it is ridiculous to diminish the opponent’s capabilities. On the contrary, the opponent can often be smarter and more imaginative. This is a historical reality. Otherwise, unpleasant questions arise about the military quality of the victors, especially if they are superior in manpower and material, as was the case in World War II.

Hitler as supreme commander

As an atypical soldier and commander-in-chief, Hitler’s behavior gave the most reason for the distorted image of himself as commander-in-chief in 1940. As a soldier from the trenches, winner of medals for heroism (Iron Cross II. and I. class) and a medal for wounds in the First World War, he remains a corporal and shows no desire for promotion[13] (Ryback 2009). A big problem arose when he became the commander-in-chief of the army, which in many ways was an example of excellence. Since Helmuth von Moltke[14], the military top was made up of the most capable officers who now found themselves in a situation where the head of state, who was not part of that elite military circle, interfered in their planning, and later in the management of operations. In such an environment, Hitler could not just pretend to be supreme commander, especially in times of great tension when demagoguery and rhetoric do not help. Hitler had charisma, which he used abundantly to impose and disarm his opponents. It is completely unthinkable for an average civilian politician to interfere in the business of the Prussian military elite and work past it or directly oppose important decisions as was the case with the plan for the western campaign.

Along with his knowledge of military issues, Hitler instinctively knew how to adapt his behavior to the company of high military officials without it looking like a pose (Guderian1961: 515) and until the Battle of Moscow in 1941-1942. could claim first-rate military successes. However, he retains his non-commissioned officer rank and decorations from the First World War while handing out marshal batons and decorations to the most meritorious commanders after the victory in the west in 1940. It is illustrative that Wilhelm Keitel[15] had to persuade him for a long time that on May 10, 1940, the day of the launch of the offensive in the West, in the first communication of the High Command of the German Army included the announcement that Hitler was at the front so that he could direct the operations. He justified his resistance by saying that he does not want to diminish the merits of the generals (Keitel 2003). And the military elite, which was mostly of noble origin and in which there were real small dynasties of career officers, found it difficult to accept that during the war the commander-in-chief makes all important decisions outside the Supreme Command of the Army.

The problem is that Hitler did not see himself as a great military leader, but as a National Socialist revolutionary. This is evidenced by the informal conversations he had during the war with the closest circle of officials and friends, which were not dominated by military issues. For example, the war campaign to the west as a major achievement is mentioned only twice in the opus, which in the English translation has 722 pages. More precisely, he finds it necessary to communicate in just one sentence the fact that it was on the Obersalzberg[16] that he came up with the idea of a plan for a campaign to the west. In short, he considered himself to be acting as Commander-in-Chief only because he saw no one at the time who could make important military decisions better than him (Trevor-Roper 1953: 82).

The animosity between Hitler and the military leadership before and during the Second World War is a kind of curiosity that cannot be found among the Western allies and especially in the USSR. This fact is important for military historians to be able to properly read the documents and draw conclusions about this issue, but that is another topic. It should be known that Hitler did not have enough time to put the armed forces under the control of the ruling party as his opponent in the East had. On the contrary, he forcibly prevented the leadership of the paramilitary organization SA[17] from taking over the armed forces immediately after coming to power. In this way, he preserved the most effective army in the world for the coming war, but also enabled the existence of opposition, especially at the higher levels of command. As a result, after the defeat in 1945, Hitler’s opposition in the military leadership tried to distance itself even more from the ruling politicians and had no interest in crediting Hitler with great military successes, but as commander-in-chief they were happy to credit him with failures. Thus, the commanders of Army Group A, with whom Liddell Hart spoke, emphasized Manstein’s plan, while “forgetting” the merits of the commander-in-chief. But when Hitler, for political reasons, allowed the British army to move across the Channel and not fall into German captivity, they blamed Hitler for taking victory from their hands, forgetting that the initiative to stop the German advance at Dunkirk came from their ranks and not from the commander-in-chief.[18]

Hitler gradually revealed his intentions to his associates

From everything that has been said so far, the environment in which the thesis about Manstein’s plan was created is visible. There are other reasons that led to the misinterpretation of this important historical episode. Since Hitler had too little time to profile the armed forces according to his political taste, so it happened that even from the highest-level information leaked about military plans. Architect Hermann Giesler[19] speaks most about this, as well as about the subject of this work, in his memories. Giesler is particularly significant for historical analysis because he was neither a political nor a military official, and Hitler treated such people unofficially and was ready to confide in them. Giesler’s credibility is supported by the fact that Hitler kept Giesler’s rival Albert Speer[20] as his personal architect and minister until the end of the war. It follows, at the very least, that Giesler had no personal motive to attribute non-existent credit to Hitler because Hitler kept him in the background all the time.

Since immediately after the Polish campaign the differences between Hitler and the High Command of the Army came to light in matters of war planning, Hitler decided to gradually reveal his plans to the innermost circle of the High Command of the armed forces. This had a remarkable effect on deceiving the enemy, but after the war caused confusion as to who should be credited for victory in the west in 1940. The history of the German campaign in the West cannot be repeated, but if the German offensive in the west in 1940 had ended in failure, it would probably be talked about the failed plan of an incompetent corporal who found himself in the position of commander-in-chief, and no one would claim authorship. Besides Giesler, the most reliable source on this topic is the chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Wilhelm Keitel, who explicitly claimed that Hitler had an original plan from October 1939 that provided for the concentration of forces and the transition across the Meuse River near Sedan and arrival at the Channel near Abbeville, which was significantly different from the plan from the First World War.

Figure 2. Franch and German plans for the war campaign in 1940.[21]

Hitler first obliged his aides to keep quiet about it, and then he gradually won Alfred Jodl[22] and then Wilhelm Keitel over to his concept. Because he did not trust the Chief of Staff of the Army High Command  Franz Halder[23] and the Army Commander Walther von Brauchitsch, nor did he value them as military officials, and he was aware that information was leaking widely towards the enemy, Hitler decided on a complex game, completely atypical for the commander-in-chief. Immediately after the end of the Polish campaign, he requested that Halder inform him of the war plan for the West, listened to his proposal, demanded detailed explanations, dismissed him and then he told Keitel and Jodl in confidence that it did not occur to him to repeat the plan from the First World War because there were no more surprises there, but he had a completely different plan in mind. Since Keitel wrote his memoirs in prison in Nuremberg while awaiting execution, his account does not go into detail, so the course of events cannot be reconstructed more precisely. Keitel writes that Hitler was pleased to inform him that he had spoken with Manstein on February 17, 1940 and immediately agreed with his plan, but he did not reveal to him what stage the preparations for its realization are at. It is interesting that immediately after the conversation, Hitler told Keitel that Manstein was the only one proposing the same plan for the campaign to the west as he did. Therefore, he did not try to keep it quiet and exclusively attribute to himself the basic idea of the campaign to the west in 1940 (Keitel 2003: 119–120).

In his memoirs, the architect Giesler gives the most comprehensive account of the origin and implementation of Hitler’s war plan, which basically coincides with what Keitel presents. According to him, Hitler was playing a complex game with the Army High Command and the opponents in the West. He believed that Halder was trying to repeat the Schlieffen plan, which belonged more to the 19th century, and that he lacked the imagination, boldness and charisma of a military leader. But Hitler does not dismiss either Halder, the chief of the Staff of the Army, or Brauchitsch, the commander of the Army, because that would be harmful to the army and the public, but he does not reveal his intentions to them. He knows that some high-ranking officials are passing valuable information to the enemy[24], so it suits him to keep the enemy as long as possible in the belief that the Germans will repeat the plan from the First World War. He began to show his true intentions in November 1939, when he began to transfer armored forces towards Luxembourg in the area of gathering Army Group A, which was supposed to be the carrier of the Schwerpunkt.[25] The combat value of these units and the choice of commanders speak best of Hitler’s intentions.

According to Giesler, Hitler’s plan gradually matured so that by early January 1940 he was firmly convinced of its correctness. Interestingly, Hitler believes that strategy is not only based on intellectual foundations, but is also an art, so he later goes into tactical details such as the capture of the Belgian fort Eben Emael,[26] the area of the crossing of the Meuse River, briefs all army commanders on a topographic map, etc. In the German army, this much interference of the commander-in-chief in the implementation of the task was not a practice and further worsened relations (Saunders 2005).

On February 14, 1940, during the implementation of the war game on the map in the headquarters of the XII. army, Hitler asked the commander XIX. Armored Corps  Heinz Guderian what he would do with the corps after the crossing of the Meuse River, but refrained from expressing his views. Guderian is clear in his memoirs that according to the order from November 1939, his armored corps was at the future Schwerpunkt of Army Group A, but he further claims that Hitler accepted Manstein’s plan (Guderian 1961:106). However, it is in contradiction to the claims of Hitler’s adjutant Schmundt[27] who told Giesler that he heard about Manstein’s plan only in January 1940 and that he made preparations that Hitler receive Manstein on February 17,1940. According to Schmundt and Giesler, Hitler claimed that this further strengthened him in belief, but even then he did not reveal to Manstein the extent to which, in addition to the basic operational concept, tactical preparations were underway. Looks like Hitler’s adjutant Engel[28] best testifies to the friction between Hitler and the Army High Command. His observations completely coincide with the testimony of other officials about Hitler’s behavior. Thus, on December 6, 1939, in his diary, he notes Hitler’s determination to use armored forces on hilly terrain, without giving details (Engel 2017).

Giesler records the opinion of Keitel and Jodl that in early January 1940, that is, before the meeting with Manstein, Hitler informed them in detail about the war plan, including tactical details, and that they were surprised by his boldness and risk-taking. Keitel stated that he, as a commander, would not have the courage to do such a thing. It is valuable for researchers that Keitel’s basic theses recorded by Giesler completely match the text Keitel wrote before his execution in Nuremberg. Keitel is self-critical to the extent that he questions his rank as field marshal because he was not in command on the battlefield during the campaign, but was only a high-ranking military official and the transmission of the will of the supreme commander. If we add to that the fact that Keitel is a war loser sentenced to death, who lost his sons in the war, one would not expect him to attribute non-existent war merits to his boss. Likewise, in Keitel, Giesler’s claims that Hitler acknowledged Manstein as the only officer who had a similar plan for the campaign to the west coincide with the testimony of Manstein himself (2007: 543).

The testimony of the head of the Press office, Otto Dietrich, is also interesting, all the more so since he harshly criticized Hitler after the war, so it is out of the question that he would, for any reason, credit Hitler for Fall Gelb unless he was completely convinced of it. Dietrich believes that the plan was devised by Hitler, as he had the opportunity to see for himself during the many informal conversations that Hitler had at night with selected confidential persons. On such occasions, Hitler spoke contemptuously of the “ossified strategy of the High Army Command” and of the “Schlieffen fans”. He emphasized that in modern mobile warfare one should not look for a solution on the wings, but in frontal penetration, deep narrow penetrations into the enemy’s rear using surprise. Based on these premises, he devised a breakthrough plan at Sedan. Dietrich (2010: 63–65) also talks about the fact that Manstein’s plan served Hitler, but in a completely vague way. British historian David Irving (2002) is more precise, he claims that on February 13, 1940, Hitler told Jodl that he intended to concentrate armor for a breakthrough near Sedan, that is, before he met with Manstein. And on February 18, 1940, just one day after the conversation with Manstein, Hitler dictated a new operational plan to Brauchitsch and Halder (Trevor-Roper 2004).

Deceiving the opponent

It is difficult to find an example in military history where disagreement, mistrust and political opposition between the commander-in-chief and the military leadership were so pronounced during the war. Hitler decided to come up with a war plan of his own, independent of the High Command of the Army. The situation is complicated by the fact that Hitler did not inform the military leadership of his decisions so that basic information would not be leaked to the enemy (Suvorov[29] 2013). Instead, he took note of the proposals of the Army Command (Halder, Manstein) and waited for a suitable opportunity.

In this case, the original plan of the Army, which was similar to the Schlieffen Plan, had to be presented as Hitler’s war plan. This was of utmost importance for the success of the breakthrough at Sedan.The adversary had to remain as long as possible in the belief that the main German attack would come through Belgium. Quite by chance, the forced landing of a German plane on Dutch territory on January 10, 1940. served Hitler well. The plane contained documents about the German offensive through Belgium.[30] Since it was not the final version of Hitler’s plan[31] (Trevor-Roper 2004), the Western Allies could be even more convinced that the Germans would repeat the plan from the First World War, while Hitler in the innermost circle thoroughly prepared for something that was supposed to be a strategic surprise. First, he ordered strict discretion to the aides who provided him with the necessary maps and topographic data, and then he won over his closest collaborators – Jodl and Keitel. So, he used his weakness to profit from it. Hitler’s adjutant for the Air Force (Luftwaffe) from 1937 to 1945, confirms this unusual behavior of the commander-in-chief and Keitel’s claim that Hitler only in the company of adjutants analyzed in detail the future battlefield in the West on a large relief.

So, it could happen that Manstein did not know about Hitler’s true intentions and that until February 17, 1940 he only assumed that Hitler might have been informed about his plans. Manstein was also surprised when Hitler ordered the transfer of XIX. of the Panzer Corps to the assembly area of Army Group A west of Luxembourg on November 12, 1939. It seems that Hitler’s unusual behavior when creating the plan, strict discretion and circumvention of the Army High Command were the main reasons that the plan remained a complete unknown and ultimately a surprise to the Western Allies.

Hitler’s merits for military preparations before 1939.

Immediately after coming to power in 1933, Hitler showed a keen interest in motorized armored units. Everyone in the army was aware of the advantages of armor and was ready to accept an armored unit up to regimental level, and army officers and non-commissioned officers were trained in mobile warfare. The problem of the Army High Command was that until World War II it was only a small part of the Army could be motorized and the rest of the Army could not keep up with their pace. There was also the technical problem of how to command such a units. Hitler supported the officers who proposed the formation of armored divisions[32], and without his support, Guderian would certainly not have started forming armored divisions as early as 1935. Hermann Balck and other prominent commanders agree with Heinz Guderian’s assessment, who claim that in the Army at higher levels of command there was strong resistance to the formation of armored units above the regimental level (Liddell Hart 2002: 292–298). And these units were supposed to be the main tool of the mobile war in 1940. Their method of use and speed then represented the main surprise, especially for an opponent who was equal or stronger in armor and manpower, as was the case in 1940. And that was crucial for quick success in the West.

Hitler gave full support to the formation of armored divisions and at the same time assigned them, for the first time, an operational role in the campaign to the West. The Army High Command would certainly not do that (Keitel 2003). How much surprise Hitler achieved can be seen from the fact that Churchill stated in his memoirs that no one in Britain and France expected that the German armored forces would break through the French defenses at Sedan (Churchill 2002: 206), while on May 15, 1940, just five days after the start of the German offensive, French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud began his morning telephone call to Churchill with the words: “We have lost the battle. We are beaten” (Irving 2003: 292). It follows that Hitler first outmaneuvered his Army High Command, and then his opponents. Seen from the German side, the newly emerging war chaos is best illustrated by the statement of the commander of Army Group A, Gerd von Rundstedt that after crossing the Meuse River it would be more interesting for him to find himself in the role of an opposing commander. An adversary can be quickly thrown off balance in martial arts, but for the main adversary (France) to be so thoroughly shaken after five days of fighting is a remarkable military feat worthy of study. Let’s remember that in the First World War, the German army as an attacker was defeated on the same battlefield in a war of attrition that lasted more than four years.

CONCLUSION

The process of creation of the German war plan has elements of first-class drama, even more so if it is known that the Germans were defeated in the “first act” with great human sacrifices. Hitler’s Fall Gelb plan can be called “German” and “common” only after February 1940, when it was formulated in Directive No. X, because from then on it became the will of the Commander in Chief (Befehlshaber), while the task of the Army High Command was only to implement it in deed.

If we analyze this plan from the distance of time, then it is nothing special. The plan is a textbook example of the application of the German principle of Schwerpunkt, which was known to every officer at the tactical and operational level. But if we go back to the time when this was happening, everything looks more complicated. Let’s just take the fact that in the First World War, the German plan to attack France failed with unprecedented casualties, and because of this, German military planners were extremely restrained about offensive actions. No one was firmly convinced of victory, except for Hitler and Manstein. In the end, it all comes down to accepting or not accepting responsibility for something new and too risky. And only in this way could the opponent be surprised and thrown off balance, that is, outwitted.The principle of Schwerpunkt meant not only physically looking for a weak point in the opponent’s layout and topography, but also looking for weaknesses in his intellectual structure, command system or, popularly speaking, software. And that was precisely where the main weakness of the Western allies lay. Hitler saw that mobile warfare had gained a powerful tool and argued that “we must not repeat the linear tactics of the First World War; on the contrary, we must strike quickly and forcefully using the rapid advance of motorized and armored units to force the enemy to act quickly, which is beyond the ability of the systematic French and clumsy English” (von Bock 1996).

The victors of the First World War intended to fight a new war according to the rules of the previous one. Why bother with new solutions when they have a proven recipe? It is an example of the intellectual laziness of the winners. It turns out that the French and British were preparing for future defeat through the system of military training (Doughty 1985). Based on this, it can be said that Manstein significantly supported Hitler’s determination to implement the war plan with his proposals. There is no basis to talk about Manstein’s plan, but about Hitler’s plan for the campaign to the West in 1940. Even if Hitler knew about Mannstein’s plan from the beginning, it is more appropriate to talk about Hitler’s war plan because each army is commanded by only one person and that person has the credit for success and responsibility for failure. It is not enough to make a war plan on paper, it must be prepared and implemented. For the sake of precision, we can speak of two identical war plans that were created independently of each other. One was lying in the drawer of the High Command and the other had behind him a Commander-in-Chief who had the strength to stand up to the top of the Army to impose his will.

It should be pointed out that Hitler studied examples from military history in the correct way. It is no coincidence that even before he came to power, Alexander the Great’s maneuver in the Battle of Isa caught his eye. Hitler realized that he had a far more effective means of maneuvering a breakthrough than Alexander’s cavalry – armored motorized divisions and aviation for quick and effective support of ground operations. Their speed made it possible not to have to look for the solution of the battle on the wings of the opponent at all costs. In short, Hitler’s credit for the most spectacular military victory in history is twofold. First, as commander-in-chief he was the first to see the significance of large armored units in the implementation of mobile warfare and supported commanders who understood this. Second, on that basis he devised a war plan that was a complete surprise to his opponents.

At the level of battle, it is easy to understand tactical surprise in the capture of the Belgian fort Eben Emael, but it is very difficult to achieve this at the strategic level in the conditions of massed armies. For this, only the physical indicators of the opponent, such as the numerical situation, the distribution of forces and the type of weapons, are not sufficient. It is not enough to know only their hardware, but also their software. And the main weakness of the French army was a doctrine based on the experience of the victors from the First World War, with an emphasis on planning and firepower, which means slow decision-making. The attacker noticed and made the best use of both weaknesses. The fact that there are not many examples of breakthrough maneuvers at the battle level in military history speaks to the complexity and riskiness of implementation. Churchill and Liddell Hart rightly compare the breakthrough at Sedan with Napoleon’s maneuver in the battle of Austerlitz.

If Manstein had proposed something completely new to Hitler, Hitler would certainly have needed him during the preparations and implementation of the campaign, but that did not happen. He no longer needed Manstein then.

LITERATURE

Balck, Hermann. 2015. Order in Chaos. University Press of Kentucky.

Below, Nicolaus von. 2001. At Hitler’s Side: The Memoirs of Hitler’s Luftwaffe Adjutant 1937-1945. London: Frontline Books.

Bock, Fedor von. 1996. Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock: The War Diary 1939-1945. Schiffer Publishing.

Churchill, Winston. 2002. Drugi svjetski rat, 1. sv. Zagreb: Školska knjiga.

Dietrich, Otto. 2010. The Hitler I Knew. Skyhorse Publishing.

Doughty, Robert A. 1985. The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939. Stackpole Books.

Doughty, Robert A. 2014. The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940. Stackpole Books.

Engel, Gerhard. 2017. At the Heart of the Reich: The Secret Diary of Hitler’s Army Adjudant. Frontline Books.

Giesler, Hermann. 1977. Eine anderer Hitler. Druffel Verlag.

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FOOTNOTES

[1] It was named after Alfred von Schlieffen (1833–1913), the chief of the German General Staff (1891–1906), the conceptual originator of the strategy that envisioned waging war on two fronts. Documents on the German war plan have not been preserved. This is the reason why there is a controversy among historians about how to call the German war plan before the First World War. In any case, the distribution of their forces in 1914 indicates the application of Schlieffen’s ideas.

[2] Source: https://www.quora.com/How-did-France-fall-in-1940-when-the-Germans-did-the-exact-same-thing-in-1914. (November 20, 2016.).

[3] German: Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH): Supreme Command of the Army.

[4] Erich von Manstein (1887–1973), one of the most capable German commanders in the Second World War, in 1940 he was the chief of staff of Army Group A. His plan envisaged delivering the main blow to the French across the Ardennes near the city of Sedan on the Meuse River, and not via Belgium. The plan for the war campaign to the west had two phases, the Yellow Plan (German: Fall Gelb) and the Red Plan (German: Fall Rot). .

[5] Basil Henry Liddell Hart (1895–1970), a distinguished British military historian.

[6] In 1944, Manstein was removed from his post as commander of Army Group South. On that occasion, in a farewell visit, Hitler gave him personal recognition as the only officer who advised him on the decisive breakthrough at Sedan.

[7] In 1939 and 1940, the Germans had three army groups in the west, from north to south they are B, A and C.

[8] The creation of a plan should be distinguished from its implementation. There is extensive literature on the implementation of the plan, especially by American authors. As can be seen from the title, the focus of this paper is on establishing the authorship of the German war plan.

[9] German: Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW): Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, formed in 1938.

[10] This was the situation before the First World War. The German Emperor was the supreme commander, but did not actively interfere in war planning and implementation of operations.

[11] Wilhelm Keitel’s memoirs were published in 1965, during Manstein’s lifetime, and Hermann Giesler’s memoirs in 1977, after Manstein’s death. Manstein could have supplemented his memoirs in the editions after 1955 or commented in any way on Keitel’s claims that Hitler independently devised the plan for the campaign to the west, but he did not.

[12] Hermann Balck (1893–1982) is one of the most capable German commanders of armored units in the Second World War. After 1945, he remained respected in expert military circles. The Americans used his experiences and suggestions in military exercises against the Warsaw Pact.

[13]  Max Amann claims that Hitler refused the promotion on the grounds that he enjoyed greater respect without an officer’s rank.

[14] Helmuth von Moltke (1800–1891) was the head of the Supreme Staff from 1857 to 1888.

[15] Wilhelm Keitel (1882–1946), Chief of the High Command of the German Army from 1938 to 1945.

[16] Obersalzberg is an area above the town of Berchtesgaden in Bavaria, where Hitler’s private residence was.

[17]The SA (Sturmabteilung: Assault Squad) was a paramilitary organization of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei – NSDAP). The name is taken from the elite German military units from the First World War.

[18] Winston Churchill (1874–1965), British Prime Minister from 1940 to 1945, claims in his memoirs (2002) that after 1945, the British found documents in the archives of the 4th Army from which it is evident that the request to the Supreme Command originated from that level to make a decision on further movements to close the ring around the British forces at Dunkirk. In his memoirs, Keitel (2003) fiercely criticizes the commander (he does not mention his name) in the field who wanted to shift responsibility to his superiors in this way. According to Keitel, in the spirit of German military doctrine, he had to act first, not waste time, and that means accepting responsibility for a possible failure, and then seek the opinion of his superiors. For more detailed information on the German command system, see: Goluža (2006).

[19] Hermann Giesler (1898–1987), German architect, a confidant of A. Hitler.

[20] Albert Speer (1905–1981), personal architect of A. Hitler, Minister of Armaments (1942–1945) and War Production (1943–1945).

[21] Source: https:/www.google.hr/search?q=manstein+plan&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjo4ay2uKrLAhWchQKHQS2CewQ_AUI­BygB&biw=1593&bih=1033&dpr=0.9#imgrc=w0DVdHT5p17EkM%3A (20. studenog 2016.).

[22] Alfred Jodl (1890–1946), head of the Operations Department of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (1938–1945).

[23] Franz Halder (1884–1972), Chief of the Army High Command (1938–1942).

[24] Wilhelm Canaris (1887–1945), head of the military intelligence service (Abwehr) from 1935 to 1944, is one of the opposition centers from where information leaked to opponents. According to Giesler, Hitler withdrew the order to launch the offensive in November because German intelligence in the West received information that it was known to the enemy. It is unclear from Giesler’s account whether Hitler really wanted, in the conditions of the extremely harsh winter of 1939/1940, to launch an offensive in the west.

[25] The German term Schwerpunkt is closest in meaning to “main effort”. In this case, according to Hitler’s Directive No. X of February 18, 1940, the Schwerpunkt was supposed to be south of the line Liège – Charleroi, and the bearer of Army Group A, formed on October 24, 1939, commanded by Gerd von Rundstedt. Within Army Group A, the carrier was the armored group (Panzergruppe) commanded by Ewald von Kleist. It is about the 19th century. Armored Corps, XIV. motorized corps and regiments Grossdeutschland and SS Leibstandarte.

[26] According to the testimony of General Kurt Student, on October 27, 1939, Hitler asked him for his opinion on whether it was possible to land paratroopers loaded into aircraft gliders at the Eben Emael fortress. For the opponent, at the level of the battle, this idea was as much a surprise as at the operational-strategic level the idea of Schwerpunkt through the Ardennes.

[27] Rudolf Schmundt (1896–1944), Hitler’s adjutant who in late 1939 and early 1940 contacted various commands by jumping the military ladder. That is how it could happen that Manstein’s plan reached Hitler past the blockade of the Supreme Command of the Army.

[28] Gerhard Engel (1906–1976), Hitler’s adjutant for the Land Army from 1938 to 1943.

[29] Viktor Suvorov was a Soviet military intelligence officer until 1978. According to Suvorov, during World War II, the USSR had several intelligence networks in Europe that operated completely independently. His claim that only in the Supreme Command of the German Army they had seven high-ranking officers who worked under the code name Viking is significant for this work. For details, see the magazine: Krasnaya zvezda, December 23, 1989.

[30] The documentation was supposed to be delivered by land, but the officers carrying it decided to transport it by air, and due to fog and poor visibility, the plane was forced to land on Dutch territory.

[31]The final version of the plan for the campaign to the west is contained in Directive number X. The text of the directive has been preserved only in part, as the basis of the ground army orders.

[32] For more detailed information in Croatian about German armored divisions and German-style mobile warfare, see: Goluža (2007).