A good number of commentators believe that German militarism and national socialist fanaticism in WW II is behind their success. The true explanation of the most effective military organization in recent European history can be found in the field of military software, which means in the system of command and control, military training and education, and the selection of officers and non-commissioned officers.
GERMAN’S SECRET WEAPON
Miroslav Goluža
UDK 355.3(430)
355.133.4(430)
356.2(430)
Original scientific work
Received: 16.12.2006.
Accepted: 9.1.2007.
Polemos 9 (2006.) 2: 63-72, ISSN 1331-5595
Summary
Exceptionally unfavorable strategic position of Prussia made its military leadership act quickly in search of new solutions. A part of military analysts attributed German efficiency to exceptional discipline and repressive measures employed to keep the discipline. According to other analysts, Wehrmacht was so fast on account of the use of tanks, motorized vehicles and airplanes. A large number of the analysts believe that German militarism and National Socialist fanaticism in WW II is the root of their success, especially so when discussing the persistent defense actions in the second phase of the war. The proper explanation of the most efficient military organization in recent history can be found in the area .military
software., i.e. in the system of command and control, appropriate military training and education and the selection of officers and non-commissioned officers. The system of mission command (Auftragstaktik) was not forced on the military from the top. It grew from the bottom, from German mentality and behavior, and Moltke the Elder contributed greatly to its being institutionalized. This system facilitates the release of the enormous amount of energy of individual initiative which is mostly unexploited in the majority of military organizations. This is the explanation for the efficiency of German operations, and not the technical equipment of their military. This discussion does not intend to offer German examples as the best solutions for our military organization; however, the system of mission command deserves more attention both in the military as well as in civilian sector
Keywords: Moltke the Elder, German General staff (Grosser Generalstab), mission command (Auftragstaktik), detail command (Befehlstaktik), individual initiative, selection and training of officers and NCOs, mobile warfare (Bewegungskrieg).
At the end of the Second World War, the USA and the USSR started a kind of race to capture German engineers who worked on rocket armament projects. A large part of the readers know about the story about secret weapons such as V-2 rockets and about the first operational jet fighter plane Me-262. Likewise, a wide range of readers know what Blitzkrieg is when talking about German rapid attack operations in the first phase of WW II. Blitzkrieg has become a term that reminds me of an unexpected natural disaster to which the attacked parties were exposed in the period from 1939 to 1941. At the same time, the logical question does not arise why the alleged “mishap” happened only in one direction? Why did the armies of the three allied countries, which had all the superiority, fail to quickly reckon with the Wehrmacht in the second phase of the war, when they had the strategic initiative, taking into account that it was always in the interest of all warring parties to achieve their goals quickly and with less losses? Why was the Wehrmacht defeated only in a war of attrition (war on several fronts, destruction of industry)?
If we want to understand the course of the war in Europe in a military sense, then obviously the answer should not be sought, speaking in modern IT terminology, in the field of hardware, but in the software of the conflicting armies. If we understand military history not only as the history of battles and weaponry, but also as the history of military organization, command and leadership systems, training and education, then the real answer can be found in the second half of the 19th century, when Moltke the Elder[1] reshaped the Prussian General Staff (Grosser Generalstab). Moltke maintains that detailed planning or direct command (Befehlstaktik)[2] in the time of mass armies, which are spread over a large area, is possible only until the beginning of combat operations. From that moment on, unplanned things usually happen, which Clausewitz called the “fog of war”. In such a situation, no senior commander knows better what is happening than the commander who is in direct combat contact. Better said, the commander who tries to do this wastes a lot of time and energy and in the end his movements are slowed down. Extremely unfavorable geostrategic position and limited human and material resources of Prussia (Germany) force their commanders to look for new solutions and to be faster and more efficient than their opponents. Moltke found the solution in the system of indirect or decentralized command, which would later be called Auftragstaktik.[3] Auftragstaktik is one of the basic characteristics of German General staff. It can be said freely that this system was revolutionary in its time, taking into account the society in which it was created as well as the military environment of the neighboring countries. Moltke obviously had a lot of imagination and breadth typical of an intellectual. This system has survived four German states and is still in force in the Bundeswehr today. In it, the commander explains to the subordinate what he is asking of him and what is the task that needs to be done and what resources are available to him. The subordinate decides how to perform the task and accepts responsibility for it. In this way, the great energy of individual initiative that exists in every army, which is restrained to a greater or lesser extent in the system of direct command, is released. Officers who have undergone training according to this command system become more creative, unforeseen and abnormal situations become for them less confusing, they are more prone to improvisation and, after all, they become faster in their actions if they have as their opponent commanders who are formed according to the doctrine of direct command and who in such situations wait for a new order so that they can act in a newly created situation. It is very important to point out that in this kind of command and control system it is much easier to determine responsibility for success but also for failure in the implementation of the task. The positive selection of officers is more emphasized here. It is hard to imagine that a commander of mediocre abilities will push through in this kind of system thanks to his “connections”. There is simply no place for him.
German military manuals explicitly encourage decisive and quick initiative at all levels: “A favorable opportunity will never be taken advantage of, if commanders wait for orders. Everyone, from the highest commander to an ordinary soldier, must always be aware that inactivity and indecision will burden him much more than misused resources”. (Dupuy, T.N. 1977:116) And indeed, when the commander of the German forces in Italy, Marshal Kesselring, analyzes the American-British offensive operations after 1943, he constantly points out that some Allied commanders are too cautious, indecisive and miss many favorable opportunities, and that would he personally in their place, with so much superiority in the air and at sea, solve the matter in a short time.
Of course, the question inevitably arises: if the advantages of indirect command are so obvious, why haven’t other armies accepted it? It should be noted right away that it is much easier to organize combat operations using a direct command system. For the indirect command system, it is necessary to fulfill several preconditions and, in the end, it is not possible to draw it in detail. No one can be precise to mark where are the limits up to which individual initiative can be tolerated in a typically hierarchical organization, such as the army, in conditions of war. An anecdote that circulated in the German armies since the Prussian-French war in 1871. is also interesting. According to that anecdote, Prince Friedrich Karl, the commander of the 2nd Prussian Army, reprimanded a major for his failure at the tactical level. He defended himself in a classic way, typical for all armies: he claimed that he was only following the orders of his superiors and that this order was for him the same as an order from the commander-in-chief (at that time it was the King of Prussia). Prince Charles, who was the nephew of the Prussian king, replied in the following way: “His Majesty gave you the rank of major because he believed that you would be able to judge when it was necessary not to carry out his orders.” (Dupuy T. N. 1977:116).
For the system of indirect command to function, Moltke had to fulfill some prerequisites:
thorough training and education of officers, unique operational and tactical actions, but flexibility in application;
selection through the training system exclusively on the basis of achieved results;
Moltke personally, and without interference from the side, selected a small number of officers who had completed the Kriegsakademie and they were included in the training of the General Staff, and then rotated to command positions in units from the regiment up. The officer corps of the General Staff was the elite of the Prussian-German army.
Here, the question necessarily arises: to what extent can the military organization be flexible in tolerating individual initiative, while at the same time maintaining the authority of the chain of command, which is necessary? General Senger refuses to carry out Hitler’s order to shoot captured Italian officers after Italy’s capitulation (Dupuy T.N. 1977:116). His superior, Marshal Albert Kesselring, knows this well, but since the aforementioned commander shows exceptional success in the evacuation of German forces from Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily, as well as in the defensive battles at Monte Cassino, Kesselring de facto promotes his armored corps commander because he assigns him forces which are the equivalent of an army, only that it does not call it by its proper name, and so formally he satisfies his superiors. (Dupuy T. N. 1977:282) The system of indirect command on the German side showed good results not only in offensive but also in defensive operations in the Second World War. General Hermann Balck, as division commander, organized a successful defense on the Chirr River against the Red Army in 1943, sometimes ignoring orders from the army level. Thus, according to his assessment, he deploys anti-armor means in one place instead of along the entire line of defense and uses various improvisations in order to create the impression with the attackers that he has more forces at his disposal than in reality. (De Puy 1980:39). Simply put, German commanders applied mobile warfare as a solution not only in offensive but also in defensive operations. In military analyses, this is referred to as elastic defense in depth. This is especially interesting when it is successfully carried out against a much stronger opponent, who applies a direct command system, in conditions where the supreme commander (Hitler) directly interferes in the course of defense operations and demands static defense and guarding the occupied terrain at all costs.
It is clear to the supporters of Auftragstaktik that many problems arise in the implementation of this system, but also that the overall benefits are significantly greater. Ervin Rommel, as commander of the 7th Armored Division in the attack on France in 1940, imposed such a pace and leadership style that he came into conflict with his headquarters due to lack of coordination. His response to the remarks was that each officer in the division must be able to make decisions independently in accordance with the general plan without waiting for orders, and that individual “academic soldiers” cannot understand this. From this time distance, we can conclude that Rommel’s behavior was risky and that it created problems in performance, but it caused even bigger problems for the opponent (Liddell Hart 1982:85).
The fact is that the German armies in the First World War got bogged down in the Western front in the war of position (Stellungskrieg), but their doctrine was not static at all. In the Main Instructions to the XI. army, General Mackensen[4] points out that “In order for the attack to succeed, it must be carried out at high speed… Thus, the army commander cannot precisely determine the objectives for each day, if he does not want to prevent the possibility of further progress… Any progress beyond the given framework will be exploited and welcomed”. To the same extent, the German command system in the First World War was “lightning” fast, but without the technical assistance of motor vehicles, and above all they lacked a suitable man as a head of the General Staff. German commanders in the First World War had much more freedom for individual initiative than their opponents. Moreover, it was clear to every commander that it was strictly forbidden to delay a counterattack before permission from a higher level arrived.
On this occasion, I do not intend to dwell on the reasons that compromised German plans in the First World War. The fact is that almost the same German officers who were tapping in the place for years in 1914-18, in the Second World War solved things in ten days. From the aforementioned quotes, it is evident that the army with the old doctrine got what it lacked the first time, namely motor vehicles and airplanes. Seen from the German side, Blitzkrieg was only a form of mobile war (Bewegungskrieg). The speed with which operations were carried out against an equally strong or stronger opponent in the first phase of the war cannot be explained without “military software”. The latter is usually decisive. Heinz Guderian as the commander of the XIX. Armored Corps in 1940. was on the Channel in ten days. His superiors warn him of the risks, try to stop him, in one word, they all elegantly remove the responsibility for a possible defeat from themselves, and he continues to advance under various pretexts, aware of the risks and the fact that he will be personally responsible in case of failure. And the risk was indeed there bigger, if you take into account the fact that the attacked in the previous war was the winner. The most important thing here is to notice that no one stops or replaces him with an explicit order, and that is very easy to do in any army. During Guderian’s tenure, frictions and disagreements typical of modern mobile warfare appeared, but the chain of command was flexible enough to amortize individual initiative and at the same time maintain its uprightness. On the other hand, a smaller number of people know that Guderian did stop at the Canal just when the final blow had to be delivered, but that interruption was of a purely political nature. Guderian received the classic order from the supreme commander (Führersbefehl) to stop and he did it this time.
In the army, which is based on the system of indirect command, the size of the headquarters is necessarily reduced at all levels. Thus, for example, Moltke’s task force in the war with France in 1871. had only 14 officers, 10 cartographers, 7 officials and technical staff (Liddell Hart 1982:97). One of the most competent military commentators, J. F. C. Fuller, claims that Moltke, who commanded three Prussian armies in that war, did not issue a single order except for a brief intervention with the head of staff of the III. army. It is interesting that the British officers, when they analyze their opponent from the Second World War, notice how bulky the British headquarters were in that war and how they were like an anthill. At the same time, they draw attention to the fact that it is necessary to thoroughly study the speed with which the Germans in the defensive operations “created” new, combat-ready units from broken units (Powell 2003).
In the German army, the system of indirect command was the principle and practice even at lower levels of command. General Balck claims that he tried to direct the training of non-commissioned officers so that it is not based on classical drill, but on understanding, because “every training must start from respect for the human being and his free will. This is not always easy, but it is the only way to achieve something”. (De Puy 1980:17) When Bundeswehr general Werner Widder, in his lecture at the American Command Headquarters in Fort Leavenworth, wanted to explain their system to the participants using examples from the Second World War, he used the airborne operation to capture Eben Emael in Belgium in 1940. to illustrate it. On that occasion, a small strike group commanded by a first lieutenant and a non-commissioned officer showed initiative in unforeseen circumstances, without waiting for additional orders or instructions, thus significantly influencing the course of operations.[5] The battalion commander could in 1917 – 1918. on his own initiative to launch part or all of the battalions in the regiment in a counterattack in order to take advantage of a favorable opportunity. On the other hand, the British and French had to get permission from the corps or army level for additional forces at the same time, and this always means a loss of time. The same thing happened when using artillery. The Germans could decide on the use of artillery at the division level, and the British and French at the corps level (Lupfer 1981). The fact that the British asked the battalion commander to be near the phone at all times so that he could inform his superior about the current situation as quickly as possible speaks for itself. The superiors want to have everything under control with all their might. At the same time, his opponent demands from the same commander to be “as close as possible to the battle line” and at the same time encourages him to act independently. After the war, the French claim in their analyzes that their High Commands, which could quickly receive all important information, were prone to excessive centralization, so that nothing could be done without their orders; they took away (from subordinates) all initiative and responsibility and our officers and non-commissioned officers lost their sense of initiative and responsibility in that school. This was a major shortcoming, the consequences of which were felt in a cruel way later (Lupfer 1981:21).
Every military organization is by its nature quite rigid. This is especially true in war. Moltke laid the foundations for an army that was open enough for different opinions and solutions despite the emphasized hierarchical structure. After heavy losses, the Germans took advantage of the winter break in the First World War in 1916-1917. in order to change the defense doctrine on the fly. The process of applying the new doctrine vividly speaks of the elasticity of that military organization at higher levels of command. Fixed defense on the first line should have given way to elastic defense in depth. The new doctrine is personally supported by the deputy head of the General Staff, Erich Ludendorff, but he always says that it is “our” doctrine, not “mine”, because it was written by one colonel and captain. Although the war continues, Ludendorff does not use the possibility of imposing a new doctrine by command from above. On the contrary, he carefully observes what prominent commanders think about it, because “orders on paper are useless in themselves if they are not truly accepted by officers and soldiers”. He goes so far as to publish, along with the text of the draft of the new doctrine, the critical opinion of officers who disagree with the new doctrine. Later it turned out that he accepted and remarkably applied the new doctrine during the French offensive in 1917. It is obvious that the application of Auftragstaktik in the German Imperial Army in the First World War was not limited only to combat operations. Individual initiative was tolerated in the intellectual field as well. It would be interesting to know how many senior officers in contemporary European armies can psychologically endure Ludendorff’s practice?
Without any doubt, the Prussian-German General Staff had a great influence on the military thought and military organization of other countries. After the Second World War, the American military historians and their Army took the lead in this. It is the subject of close study by members of the US military, and the system of indirect command has been accepted as the doctrine of the US Army (*** 2003. FM 6-0). A probably unique example in military history speaks of this: in 1952, the officers of the Department of Military History of the US Army engaged the former chief of the Staff of the German Army[6], Franz Halder, and a group of Wehrmacht generals, that is, former opponents as an expert team that will analyze FM 100-5 from their point of view, which formulates the basics of the American doctrine of tactics (*** 2001. On the German Art of War: Truppenfuehrung).
Of course, Auftragstaktik is not an exclusively German invention. Examples of this commands can also be found in other armies, especially in guerilla warfare. Thus, the Americans cite examples of indirect command from their civil war (*** 2003. FM 6-0:21-24), but nowhere in recent military history was it the case that it was systematically built to such an extent through education and training as doctrine and conducted in combat operations as a practice as much as in the German army. When von Manstein analyzes the Eastern War in his memoirs, he nowhere says that his soldiers are individually better than the enemy’s, but emphasizes that the Germans had a superior command system. Manstein states that this system was not imposed from the outside, but that it was corresponded to the German mentality, which has strong individualism and willingness to take risks. He claims that the Germans resorted to direct command where everything was planned in detail only in exceptional situations (Mannstein 1968:319). Similar assessments were made by Wehrmacht General Hermann Balck together with his chief of staff during a working meeting and simulation exercise with American commanders in the then Federal Republic of Germany on December 19-23, 1980. He claims that “Unforeseen combat actions confused the Russian, that they disturbed his scheme, and he would then wait for new orders from above. Many times, he would simply stop and wait for reinforcements or new orders to arrive. Russians are strong, but immobile – they are rigid and restrained by certain schemes, and in that way they are more vulnerable than us. We had better individuals, especially at the lower levels of command”. (De Puy 1980:13).
In order to implement indirect command, there must be, in addition to high training, complete trust and loyalty throughout the chain of command. The same applies to different units that operate separately in a large area. For example, during comprehensive maneuvers, the success of a unit depends not only on its own efforts, but also on the efforts of other units participating in it. In contrast, the Red Army, which at the beginning of the war had a double chain of command, one was classical and the other was party-based through political commissars, although the vast majority of officers belonged to the same party.
Part of the authors explains the efficiency and speed of German military actions by the fact that they had high discipline and that disobedience was severely punished, that the German army in the Second World War had at its disposal armored mechanized and air formations, as well as that she was fanaticized by the National Socialist ideology. When it comes to discipline, it should be pointed out that restraint was supported by the harshest measures in other armies as well, especially in the Red Army. Otherwise, high German commanders stated during the war that the discipline and fighting quality of the German soldier was at a higher level in the First World War. Hitler personally constantly complained that the Wehrmacht was not sufficiently profiled in the National Socialist spirit. I think that the causes of the long-term and organized resistance of the Wehrmacht should be sought in the firm Allied position on the unconditional capitulation of Germany, which left little room for high-ranking officers who would support a political solution without Hitler, as well as in the fear of Bolshevism.
If we don’t want to remain superficial and if we intend to understand from a purely military point of view why the Prussian-German armies from the half of the XIX. centuries showed exceptional efficiency in offensive and defensive actions in an extremely unfavorable strategic environment, then we should look for answers in the military organization, in their system training, commanding and leading. It is safe to say that Blitzkrieg, with its speed and complexity, which is characteristic of such a way of waging war, would have been impossible without a system of indirect command and conducting more appropriate training and education that stood in its support. Decision-making speed, not speed of tanks, is the key to understanding German military successes. Stereotypes are never useful, and in the army they can be disastrous because misconceptions are paid dearly. One of these wrong stereotypes is the one that portrays German officers as some kind of robots, for whom blind obedience is typical. In fact, the Prussian-German General Staff was the “secret German weapon” mentioned at the beginning of the text, only that there were no secrets in the organization of that staff. It did not produce new Napoleons or military leaders like Frederick the Great, but that organization constantly generated excellent commanders. As an institution, the Grosser Generalstab was at the center of the most efficient military organization in recent European history. That this is so, is shown by the fact that the same institution was disbanded together with the Kriegsakademie after the defeat in the First and Second World Wars!
Military history not only helps us to properly understand past events, but at the same time offers us answers to many questions that are posed to every army. Of course, one should always keep in mind one’s own peculiarities and try to derive as much benefit as possible from other people’s examples. When it comes to the system of indirect command, it is imperative for the officers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia to familiarize themselves with it not only because of its obvious advantages, but also because it is a doctrine that is thoroughly studied in the NATO armies and this is an opportunity to reexamine one’s own mentality, principles and practice.
LITERATURE
*** (2001.) On the German Art of War – Truppenfuehrung. Edited and Translated by Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki. London. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 2001. (Translation of the rules of the German army Num. 300, Truppenfuehrung from 1933.)
*** (2003.) FM 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. Washington.
De Puy, William (1980.) Generals Balck and von Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Corporation. Tehnical Report BDM Corporation/W-81-077-TR, Mc Lean, Va.
Col. Dupuy, Trevor Nevitt (1977.) A Genius for War: the German Army and General Staff, 1807. 1945. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
Liddell Hart, Basil Henry (1982.) The Rommel Papers. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press.
Lupfer, Timothy T. (1981.) The Dynamics of Doctrine: the Changes in German
Tactical Doctrine During the First World War (Leavenworth Papers, No. 4). Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute.
Manstein, Erich von (Man.tajn) (1968.) Lost Victories (Izgubljene pobede). Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod.
Powell, G. S. (2003.) .Lessons Still to Learn. , British Army Review. 113, November; 43-45.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, chief of the Prussian (German) General Staff (1857-1888). He should be distinguished from Moltke the Younger, who was also chief of the General Staff (1906-1914).
[2] In American or NATO terminology, it is a “detail command”. For the sake of simplicity, as well as for the lack of a more appropriate term, I will use the Croatian term “direct command” in the following.
[3] NATO term “mission command”. For the above reasons, hereinafter referred to as “indirect command”.
[4] Nijemci su 1915. godine napali Srbiju. U tom pohodu njihovim snagama je zapovijedao General von Mackensen.
[5] The lecture that Werner Widder gave on April 3, 2002 to the participants of the 2002 Command and Control School in Fort Leavenworth, USA, “Auftragstaktik and Innere Fuehrung“.
[6] Obercommando des Heeres, OKH.
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